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McKinley: Oil and Gas - Defining the Point of Sale for Gas under an Oil and

CASE NOTE
OIL AND GAS-Defining the Point of Sale for Gas Under an Oil and Gas
Lease Containing Both Market Value and Amount Realized Royalty
Provisions. State v. Davis, 728 P.2d 1107 (Wyo. 1986).
The State of Wyoming owns certain oil and gas interests in Converse
County, Wyoming. Davis Oil Company (hereinafter Davis) leases this interest. Davis owns and operates two producing wells on the lease, Concamp State No. 1 and No. 2.' Each of these wells produces casinghead
gas2 and oil. Davis transports the casinghead gas in its pipeline to a
separator located on the lease premises.' The separator removes water
impurities from the casinghead gas to help facilitate transporand other
4
tation.

The gas leaves the separator and enters a pipeline owned by Phillips
Petroleum Company (hereinafter Phillips).5 Shortly after the gas enters
the pipeline, but before it leaves the lease premises, Phillips meters and
tests the gas.' This testing determines the quantity and quality of the
raw casinghead gas as it enters Phillips' gathering system.7 Phillips transports this gas to a main transmission line and commingles it with gas
from other wells in the Powder River Basin.8 Phillips then transports the
gas to its processing plant in Douglas, Wyoming. 9 At the plant Phillips
processes the gas into residue gas and natural gas liquids. Phillips sells
the residue gas to Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company under a long-term
sales contract, and sells the natural gas liquids to Phillips' refinery in
Borger, Texas.' 0 At the plant tailgate, Phillips meters both the residue
gas and natural gas liquids for quantity and quality."
Not all of the gas produced from the two Concamp wells makes it to
the plant tailgate. The main transmission line uses gas booster stations
to transport the gas to Phillips' plant. These booster stations are fueled
by gas from the pipeline. 2 Phillips fuels its plant with gas taken from the
1. State v. Davis, 728 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Wyo. 1986).

2. Casinghead gas is gas produced in conjunction with liquid hydrocarbons and other
products. Id at 1108.
3. Id.
4. Id

5. Brief for Appellant at 3, State v. Davis, 728 P.2d 1107 (Wyo. 1986) (No. 86-71) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].

6. Id
7. Id at 22.

8. Brief for Appellee at 6, State v. Davis, 728 P.2d 1107 (Wyo. 1986) (No. 86-71) (hereinafter Brief for Appellee].

9. Id

10. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, Appendix A at 3.

11. Id at 2. The plant tailgate refers to the discharge side of Phillips' plant where

processed gas is delivered to the purchaser of the processed gas.

12. Brief for Appellee, supra note 8, at 6. Gas booster stations are compressors that

maintain enough pressure in the pipeline system to move the gas to Phillips' plant.
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the gathergas stream in the plant, 3 and sometimes vents gas from both
4
ing system and the plant directly into the atmosphere.'
In order to sell the casinghead gas from the two Concamp wells, Davis
entered into two gas sales contracts with Phillips.' 5 The contracts provide that title and control pass to Phillips upon delivery of the gas to Phillips' facilities.'0 Davis receives a percentage of Phillips' proceeds from the
subsequent sale of the processed products. 7 These prices are then multiplied by the applicable percentage amount of tailgate products attributable to the Concamp wells to determine the amount Phillips owes Davis."8
Phillips uses this figure to determine the royalty due the state and deducts
the royalty from the amount paid to Davis.' 9
The lease entitles the State of Wyoming, as lessor, royalties on gas
produced from the Concamp wells. The State drafted the lease, and since
1960, all state oil and gas leases have contained the following royalty provision:
(d) ROYALTIES.

The royalties to be paid by lessee are:

(ii) on gas, including casinghead gas or other hydrocarbon substance, produced from said land saved and sold or used off the
premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or other products therefrom, the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold
or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall
be one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale. (emphasis
added) 20 .
Davis had been paying the State one-eighth of the amount it received,
i.e. amount realized, from the sale of gas to Phillips. 21 The State notified
Davis that it believed the royalty payments were inadequate. Davis then
sought a declaratory judgment in district court that the royalty payments
had been properly made. The district court determined that for royalty
purposes the gas had been "sold or used off the premises" and that the
lease required Davis to pay royalties based on the market value."
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed the issue of where
the sale of gas for royalty purposes occurred."3 If the sale occurs off the
13. Id at 8.
14. Id at 8-9. Phillips does not include any of the gas used for these purposes in the
calculation determining the amount of residue gas and natural gas liquids at the plant tailgate attributable to the Concamp wells. Id.
15. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 3. For a complete understanding of the gas
sales contracts, see Brief for Appellant, Appendix B, which sets forth one of the Casinghead
Gas Contracts between Davis and Phillips. Id
16. Id at Appendix B at 1.
17. Davis, 728 P.2d at 1108.
18. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, Appendix A at 1-5. For a complete discussion
of the pricing formula, see Appendix A. Id
19. Davis, 728 P.2d at 1108.
20. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 5.
21. Id at 4.
22. Davis, 728 P.2d at 1108.
23. Id. at 1109.
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premises, royalties are based on market value, and if the sale occurs at
the well, royalties are based on the amount realized. The court affirmed
the district court's decision and held that the sale occurred off the
premises. The following discussion centers around determining the elements that define a sale of gas. The passage of title, possession, control
and the pricing function will be discussed as they relate to defining whether
the sale of gas occurred on or off the premises. This casenote examines
what constitutes a sale of gas for royalty purposes. Since this was a case
of first impression in Wyoming, a review of other courts' decisions on this
question is insightful.
BACKGROUND

Federal
The case of Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Company,
involved a situation where Shell, as lessee of the mineral interests, also
transported and processed the gas in its own facilities. 6 Shell sold the
processed gas to Miscoa and Mississippi Power and Light under two gas
sales contracts. 7 Both contracts provided that title to the gas passed in
and
the field, but the buyers under the contracts did not take delivery
28
control of the gas until it had been processed and redelivered.
Apparently the parties to the contracts agreed that title to the gas
would pass in the field to avoid state regulation.2 9 The contracts provided that the sale price included a substantial consideration for transportation and processing services provided by Shell. Under the contracts,
measurements of the quantity and quality of the gas used for determining the amount owed by Miscoa were to be made after Shell processed
the gas.2 0 Shell had been paying royalties based on the actual revenues
received from the sale of processed gas and sulfur under the two contracts,
a substantial portion of the processing costs
and Shell had been deducting
3
from the royalties paid. '
The leases in question contained royalty provisions similar in all relevant parts to the State of Wyoming leases.2 The lessors sued Shell seeking to have the royalties paid on market value, not the amount realized
from the sale by Shell. The trial court determined that since title to the
gas passed in the field, i.e. at the well, the royalties were to be paid on
the amount realized from the sales by Shell.22 The court of appeals re24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

I& at 1110.
726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984).
Id at 229.
Id
Id
Id

30. Id
31. Id
32. Id. at 228. The royalty provision provides that royalties "on gas.., sold or used
off the premises... [will be based on] the market value; ... [for] gas sold at the wells ...
[it will be the] amount realized." Id
33. Id at 229.
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versed, holding that even though the sales contracts provided that title
passed in the fields, "the gas sold by Shell was not 'sold at the well,' within
the meaning of the lease.""4
Applying Mississippi's Uniform Commercial Code sections 75-2-107(1)
(U.C.C. § 2-107), 75-2-401(1) (U.C.C. § 2-401), 75-2-105(4) (U.C.C. § 2-105)
and 75-2-501(1) (U.C.C. § 2-501)31 to the gas sales contract, the court determined that title passed at the well. Using the following analysis, the
court determined that the "simple passage of title does not control whether
the gas was 'sold at the well' within the meaning of the leases."36 The court
7
found that "at the well" describes both location and quality and that

the sale of gas occurs at the well only if its value has not increased before
the sale."8 With this in mind, the court of appeals held "that 'at the well'
refers to gas in its natural state, before the gas has been processed or transported from the well."I' Therefore, under the leases in question, the sale
of gas did not occur at the well and a market value royalty40 was appropriate.4 1 Two state supreme courts have also addressed the question of where
the sale of gas for royalty purposes occurs. These decisions focus on where
delivery, control and title of the gas pass to the buyer in determining where
the sale occurred.
State Court Decisions
In Exxon Corp. v. Middleton,4 the royalty clause4 3 in question con-

tained provisions identical in all relevant parts to the State of Wyoming
lease. Exxon owned the leases, and some of the natural gas from these
leases was processed in Exxon's plant located in the Anahuac Field." Exxon delivered the processed gas at the plant tailgate to three purchasers.41
Exxon contended that even though the sale occurred off the lease
Field where the leases were located,
premises, but within the Anahuac
46
the sale occurred at the well.
34. Id. at 231.

35. MIsS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-107(1) (1972); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-401(1) (1972); Miss.
§ 75-2-105(4) (1972); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-501(1) (1972).

CODE ANN.

36. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 232.
37. Id at 231. The court stated that "[m]arket value at the well means market value
before processing and transportation, and gas is sold at the well if the price paid is consideration for the gas as produced but not for processing and transportation." Id
38. Id at 232.
39. Id at 242.
40. As discussed by the Piney Woods court, as long as the price escalation clause in
the contract kept up with the actual market price of gas there would be little difference in
royalties using market value or amount realized. It is only when the price of gas begins to
rise much faster than the escalation clause that the lessor desires royalties based on market
value. Id at 233.
41. Id at 242. For a discussion of cases interpreting royalty provisions in general and
Piney Woods in particular, see Harris, Gas Royalties-Leading State and FederalCases Reviewed- Alice's Adventures in "Royalty-Land," 37 OKLA. L. REV. 699 (1984).
42. 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
43. Id at 241. The royalty provision provides that royalties "on gas... sold or used
off the premises... [will be based on] the market value; ... [for] gas sold at the wells ...
[it will be the] amount realized." Id
44. Id at 242.
45. Id
46. Id
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The Texas Supreme Court held that" 'off the premises' modifies both
'sold' and 'used' "and that" 'premises' is the land described in the lease
agreement." 4 7 The court then proceeded to determine which market value
was appropriate for calculating royalties. Exxon argued that market value
meant the market value when the gas sales contract became effective. The
court held that market value meant the market value when Exxon delivered the gas to the buyer. The court determined the gas could not be
sold until it was produced and held that the gas was " 'sold' when delivered by Exxon to its customers."' 8
In Matzen v. Cities Service Oil Co.," Ashland Oil Company, as lessee, maintained and operated a gathering system for leases it produced
in the Hugoton Field." Ashland and Cities Service Pipeline had entered
into a contract for the purchase of gas produced from the leases.9 ' In order to fulfill its obligation under the contract, Ashland transported the gas
to a central delivery point away from the wells where it transferred possession of the gas to Cities Service Pipeline." The royalty provisions in
these leases
were in all relevant parts the same as the State of Wyoming
3
lease.

Ashland contended that the sale of gas occurred at the well and it
had paid royalties based upon the proceeds of the gas purchase contract. 6
The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding that the sale
occurred off the premises, and therefore, royalties should be based on market value. The court found that "substantial competent evidence"" supported the holding. Thus, the point of sale was determined by the point
of delivery of the gas to the purchaser.
In Waechter v. Amoco ProductionCompany," Amoco, as lessee, sold
wet casinghead gas to Cities Service Gas Company. Amoco delivered title and control of the gas to Cities Service Gas Company at the wellhead
where the gas entered Cities' pipeline. 7 Under the gas purchase contract,
Amoco reserved the right to extract gasoline and other liquid hydrocarbons from the gas. The price Amoco was to receive for the gas was set
forth in the contract." The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that since
the lessee delivered title and possession to the gas at the well, the sale
47. Id at 243.
48. Id at 245.

49. 233 Kan. 846, 667 P.2d 337 (1983).
50. Id 667 P.2d at 340. The leases in question were located within the Hugoton Field.
The field's boundaries approximate the boundaries of the underground gas reserves. Id
51. Id at 348.
52. Id
53. Id The royalty provision provides that royalties "on gas... sold or used off the
premises... [will be based on] the market value; ...[for] gas sold at the wells... [it
will
be the] amount realized." Id
54. Id

55. Id

56. 217 Kan. 489, 537 P.2d 228 (1975), adhered to after reh'g, 219 Ken. 41, 546 P.2d
1320 (1976).
57. Waechter, 537 P.2d at 247.

58. Id
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occurred at the well.5 9 The lessee retained a right to process the gas," but
the sale occurred at the well and Amoco owed royalties on the amount
realized from the sale. 6'
Wyoming Statutes
Since, under the law of sales, Wyoming defines a sale of minerals as
a sale of goods,' 2 a discussion of the pertinent sections of Wyoming's Uniform Commercial Code is appropriate. The Wyoming statutes define a sale
as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price."63 Section
34-21-246 of the Wyoming statutes discusses the passage of title, and
states that title can pass in any manner explicitly agreed to by the parties.6' The final statute necessary for a complete understanding of a sale
of goods deals with an open price term. This statute states that "[tihe
parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the
price is not settled." 61
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

This was a case of first impression in Wyoming. The court had to determine where a sale of gas for royalty purposes occurs. Thus, the court
faced the task of analyzing courts' holdings from other jurisdictions and
applying the Wyoming statutes on the sale of goods. The court held that
since "Davis is paid for processed gas in Douglas, not casinghead gas at
the wells, ... market value, not the amount realized, is the proper standard for calculating royalties due the State." 6 Thus, the sale occurred
off the premises and the market value royalty was appropriate.
The royalty provision provides that on gas sold at the wells royalties
will be calculated on the amount realized from the sale. 7 Davis argued
that since the gas sales contracts provided that title passed at the well,
the sale occurred at the well. 6 The court agreed that title to the gas passed
from Davis to Phillips at the separator but stated that "the passage of
59. Id. at 248.

60. Id

61. IdM
62. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-207(a) (1977) reads: "A contract for the sale of timber, minerals
or the like or a structure or its materials to be removed from realty is a contract for the
sale of goods within this article if they are to be severed by the seller .... ; see U.C.C. §
2-107(1) (1978).
63. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-206(a) (1977); see U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1978).
64. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-246(a) (1977) reads in part:

(i) ... [T]itle to goods passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner
and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties;
(ii) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time
and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the
physical delivery of the goods.
See U.C.C. § 2-401(1),(2) (1978).
65. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-222(a) (1977); see U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1978).
66. Davis, 728 P.2d at 1110.
67. Id at 1108.
68. Id at 1109. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, Appendix B at 1, for the clause
dealing with delivery and passage of title.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol23/iss1/5
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title does not determine whether gas is sold 'at the wells' nor does it trigger the amount-realized provision.' The court then proceeded to analyze the reasoning of the decision in Piney Woods.70
'1

Determining that the Piney Woods court focused on the quality and
location of the gas when it was sold,' the court applied this reasoning
to the facts in State v. Davis. Analyzing Piney Woods," the Wyoming
Supreme Court determined that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the lessee must pay royalties based upon market value because the
lessee was paid for processed gas off the lease premises."3 Focusing on
where Phillips determined the contract price, the Wyoming Supreme Court
found that since the price paid to Davis depended on Phillips' sale price
after processing, the sale occurred off the premises. 4 Since Davis received
a percentage of the proceeds from the sale of processed gas, not raw gas
off
as it emerged from the well, the court determined the sale occurred
7
the premises and the market value royalty provision applied. 1
In this case, Davis delivered all its right, title and interest in the raw
gas to Phillips upon its delivery into Phillips' pipeline. 76 This delivery took
place on the lease premises before any transportation or processing of the
raw gas." The State argued that since the price Davis received depended
on the price Phillips received upon its resale of the processed products,
the sale occurred off the premises. 78 Thus, the market value royalty provision was appropriate. The Wyoming Supreme Court accepted this argument and focused its inquiry on where Phillips determined the contract
price, not on where delivery of title and control occurred."9 By focusing
on where Phillips determined the contract price, which occurred off the
premises when Phillips delivered processed gas to its purchaser, the court
determined the sale occurred off the premises.
Dissent
Unable to accept the majority's reasoning, both Justice Urbigkit and
Justice Cardine dissented. 0 The dissent focused its analysis on "whether
the gas was 'sold at the wells' pursuant to the lease terminology." 8' The
dissent rejected Piney Woods as controlling since the only similarity with
82
this case involved the pricing function which occurred after processing.
69. Davis, 728 P.2d at 1109.
70. Id at 1109-10.
71. Id. at 1110.
72. I& at 1109.
73. IM at 1110.
74. Id.
75. Id
76. Id. at 1111 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting (Justice Cardine joined in Justice Urbigkit's
dissenting opinion) (Concurring in part and dissenting on the issue involving interpretation
of the lease royalty provision).
77. IU
78. Brief for Appellee, supra note 8, at 13-14.
79. Davis, 728 P.2d at 1110.
80. Id. at 1111 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id at 1113.
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The dissent instead discussed the interpretation of state contracts and
the application of the Wyoming Statutes on sales.
The State of Wyoming wrote the lease in question and did not allow
bilateral negotiation of any provision in the lease. Davis thus faced a "take
it or leave it" lease form if it wanted to do business with the State. 3 Determining that the same principles of construction and interpretation apply in this case as apply in any normal bilateral contract, the dissent
84
argued that the Wyoming Statutes on the sale of goods should apply.
Applying sections 34-21-206 (U.C.C. § 2-106), 34-21-222 (U.C.C. § 2-305)
and 34-21-246 (U.C.C. § 2-401) of the Wyoming Statutes," the dissent argued that a present sale with an open price term occurred when the lessee transferred title and possession of the gas to Phillips at the well. The
dissent reasoned that since title passed, possession transferred, and the
buyer assumed responsibility on the lease premises, the subsequent pricing function had no bearing on the point of sale. 8 The dissent concluded
its analysis by stating that the majority erred in focusing its analysis on
the pricing function and not on the totality of the factors involved in the
sales transaction.87
ANALYSIS

Defining the Sale of Gas
In deciding the issue of where the sale of gas for royalty purposes occurs, the Wyoming Supreme Court purported to base its holding exclusively on the case of Piney Woods.88 In doing so, it misinterpreted the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in that case and focused instead
on where Phillips determined the contract price.8'
By focusing on where Phillips determined the contract price and not
on where delivery took place, the court misapplied the holding in Piney
Woods. In Piney Woods, the lessee transferred title at the well to avoid
state regulation, but the lessee retained control and possession of the gas
until after it was processed. 90 Therefore, the court of appeals looked beyond the mere passage of title to where the purchaser determined the contract price to define the point of sale. The Davis fact situation can be
distinguished, since Davis, as lessee, delivered title, control, and possession to the purchaser on the lease premises and did not retain any incidents of ownership once the gas entered Phillips' gathering system. The
court's application of Piney Woods shifts the inquiry from where Davis
delivered title, possession and control of the gas to Phillips to where Phillips calculated the amount it owed Davis for the raw gas. The resale of
the processed gas thus became the point of sale for royalty purposes even
88. Id. at 1114.

84. Id. at 1115.
85. Id at 1116.
86. Id at 1117.

87. Id at 1118.

88. Id at 1110.
89. Id
90. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 229.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol23/iss1/5

8

McKinley: Oil and Gas - Defining the Point of Sale for Gas under an Oil and
1988

CASE NoTE

though Davis relinquished all its interest in the gas upon delivery to Phillips.9 1 Although Davis relinquished its interest in the gas, it did retain
a contractual right to collect the proceeds from its sale of raw gas. The
court failed to realize that this reasoning makes the purchaser's, not the
lessee's, point of sale the determining factor for calculating royalties.
In Piney Woods, the lessee was both the producer and processor of
the gas. The lessee transported the gas to its plant for processing into
usable products. After processing, the lessee delivered the gas to its purchasers and received payment based on the amount of processed gas delivered. 9 After discussing the meaning of "at the well," 93 that court decided
that a sale off the premises occurred when the lessee delivered processed
gas to the purchaser. 94 Thus, the critical point of inquiry becomes: where
did the lessee deliver the gas to the purchaser?
By applying this reasoning to the facts in State v. Davis, the sale occurs at the well. Davis, as lessee, delivered raw gas to Phillips, its purchaser, on the lease premises. Phillips transported and processed the raw
gas and delivered processed gas to its purchaser. Therefore, Davis, as lessee, sold raw gas, and in contrast to Piney Woods, did not participate in
the transportation or processing of the gas. In this case, Davis transferred
title, possession and control of the gas to the purchaser, Phillips, when
the gas entered Phillips' pipeline. 95 The delivery of the raw gas to the purchaser occurred on the premises, and thus, the sale occurred at the well.
Upon delivery of the gas to Phillips, Davis no longer possessed any incidents of ownership to the raw gas.M The amount Phillips owed Davis for
the raw gas became the only undetermined factor in the sale. Under the
gas sales contract, Phillips compensated Davis for the raw gas based upon
a percentage of the proceeds Phillips received from the resale of the
processed gas.9 7 Therefore, a present sale occurred on the lease premises
with a price calculated on subsequent events.
The Kansas Supreme Court addressed the question of where the sale
of gas occurred in both Matzen" and Waechter." In both of those cases
the Kansas Supreme Court focused its inquiry on where delivery to the
purchaser occurred. Consistent with those cases a delivery of title, control, and possession at the well results in finding a sale at the well. Since
Davis delivered title and control to Phillips on the lease premises, 100 the
sale occurred at the well. The Texas Supreme Court's holding in Exxon
Corp. v. Middleton'0 1 further supports this analysis. There the court determined that the sale occurred when the lessee delivered the gas to its
91. Davi 728 P.2d at 1111 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
92. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 229.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

I& at 231.
Id.at 232.
Davis 728 P.2d at 1111 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1113.
Id at 1112.
233 Kan. 846, 667 P.2d 337, 348 (1983).
217 Kan. 489, 537 P.2d 228, 248 (1975).
Davis, 728 P.2d at 1111 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
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customers. 0 2 Thus, in the jurisdictions previously analyzing where a sale
of gas for royalty purposes occurred, the critical question became: where
did delivery occur? Applying the analyses from these other jurisdictions
results in finding the sale occurred at the well where Davis delivered title, possession and control of the gas to Phillips.
In Piney Woods, the delivery of possession and control occurred at
the same place the purchaser determined the amount owed the lessee. In
Davis, two sales occurred. The first sale consisted of a sale of raw gas
from the lessee to Phillips. The second sale consisted of a sale of processed
gas from Phillips to its purchaser. The lessee's, not the purchaser's, sale
should be the controlling sale for royalty purposes. The Wyoming Supreme
Court failed to address the question of where the lessee delivered possession and control of the gas to the purchaser. The court held that the passage of title did not determine where the sale occurred, '0 3 but it failed to
continue its analysis. In so doing, the court disregarded the fact that Davis delivered possession and control to Phillips at the same time it delivered title. The passage of title by itself may not determine the point of
sale,10 4 but the lessee's, not the processor's, delivery of title, possession
and control of the gas should have a bearing on where the sale occurred.
Since the lessee owns the gas originally, his acts should determine the
place of sale. When the lessee gives its ownership rights to the purchaser,
the purchaser becomes the new owner of the gas. Thus, by focusing on
where the lessee delivers title, possession and control to the purchaser,
the lessee's acts, not the purchaser's, define where the sale occurred. Since
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Kansas Supreme Court, and the
Texas Supreme Court all found delivery of possession crucial in determining where the sale occurred, the Wyoming Supreme Court should have
at least addressed the question.
Application of Wyoming's Statutes on the Sale of Goods
The majority also overlooked Wyoming's statutes on sales and the
Uniform Commercial Code. Since the statutes define a sale of minerals
as a sale of goods,101 the court should have used the Wyoming Statutes
to determine where the sale occurred. Section 34-21-206(a) defines a sale
as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price."'' 00 Davis
not only passed title,0 7 it also delivered possession and control to the buyer
at the well. By doing so, Davis satisfied the first half of the sales definition.
The second half of the definition requires that the passage of title be
for a price. The court concluded that since the price to Davis depended
on Phillips' redelivery price, the sale did not occur at the well. In reaching this conclusion, the court failed to apply section 34-21-222 which deals
102. Id at 245.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Davis, 728 P.2d at 1109.
Id
WYo. STAT. § 34-21-207(a) (1977); see U.C.C. § 2-107(1) (1978).
WYo. STAT. § 34-21-206(a) (1977); see U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1978).
Davis, 728 P.2d at 1109.
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with an open price term.'" 8 This statute states that if the parties so intend they "can conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not
settled."'1s Davis received a percentage of the proceeds Phillips received
from the sale of the processed gas. Since a contract for sale can be concluded with an open price term, it certainly can be concluded with a factored price term.'"' Thus, Davis satisfied the second half of the sales
definition.
Applying the facts of this case to the statutory definition of a sale,
the sale occurred when Davis passed title, possession and control of the
gas to Phillips for a price to be determined upon resale. Since, under the
terms of the gas sales contracts, delivery of title and possession occurred
at the inlet of Phillips' facilities"I located on the lease premises, the sale
occurred at the wells. Thus, under the statutory definition of a sale, the
sale occurred at the wells, and Davis owed royalties on the amount realized from such sale.
Policy Reasons
According to the royalty provision in the lease, the State receives
royalties based upon either the amount realized or the market value. For
sales at the well, royalties were to be based upon amount realized, and
for sales off the premises, royalties were to be based upon market value."'
This provision makes the point of sale the determining factor in deciding
which royalty clause applies.
Since the lessee produces and sells the gas, the lessee's acts determine
which royalty provision applies. If the lessee can find a buyer for the gas
at the well, then it pays royalties on the amount realized from such sale.
If the lessee has to transport the gas off the premises to a buyer, then
it pays royalties on the market value at the well. Since the State, as lessor, drafted the lease," 3 it gave to the lessee the power to determine which
royalty clause applied. If the State did not want to relinquish this right,
it could have redrafted the lease to provide that all royalties be based upon
market value.
The State's lease form has contained this royalty provision since
1960,11' and the State has permitted no bilateral negotiation of any provision in the lease. Therefore, the State has had ample time and opportunity to modify the royalty provision. Since the State did not change or
modify the royalty provision, the State must have intended to give both
royalty provisions their effect. By giving both royalty provisions effect,
the lessee's act of selling the gas determines which royalty provision applies. Davis delivered title, possession and control of the gas to Phillips
on the lease premises. Therefore, under both the Wyoming statutes and
108.
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WYO. STAT. § 34-21-222(a) (1977); see U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1978).
Id
Davis, 728 P.2d at 1117 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
Id at 1111.
Id at 1108 (majority opinion).
Id at 1114 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
Brief for Appellee, supra note 8, at 23.
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the test established by courts in other jurisdictions, the sale occurred at
the well and royalties should have been due on the amount realized from
such sale.
The State chose to keep the royalty provision in the lease and rely
on the lessee's own self-interest' 15 in maximizing the royalty due the State.
The lease also contains both lessor approval and federal floor provisions 6
to insure adequate payment of royalties. Therefore, in drafting the lease
the State must have determined that the lease provisions adequately protected its interests. The Wyoming Supreme Court should not have interpreted the lease in the State's favor just because the State desired royalties
based upon market value.
CONCLUSION

In holding that royalties due the state should be calculated based upon
market value, the Wyoming Supreme Court failed to apply both precedent and the Wyoming statutes. The court misinterpreted the holding in
Piney Woods and focused on where Phillips determined the contract price.
By doing so, the court failed to recognize that the crucial point of inquiry
was: where did delivery of title, possession and control occur? Since Davis delivered title, possession and control of the gas to Phillips on the lease
premises, the sale occurred at the well. The court failed to apply the Wyoming statutes on the sale of goods. By applying these statutes, the sale
occurred on the lease premises, and therefore, the sale occurred at the well
and royalties should have been based upon the amount realized. Thus,
under both precedent and the Wyoming statutes the sale occurred at the
well. The Wyoming Supreme Court erred in holding that Davis owed royalties based upon market value.
JOHN C. MCKINLEY

115. Davis, 728 P.2d at 1108. For every dollar of gas sold, the lessee receives 718 and
the lessor receives 118. Id.
116. Id at 1109. For a discussion of the application of these provisions, see State v. Moncrief, 720 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1986.
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